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LESSONS LEARNED FROM COMMUNITY-DRIVEN
RESPONSIVENESS DURING COVID-19
AMANDA HARRIS,* BRITTÍNI “REE BELLE” GRAY,**
CIEARRA WALKER*** & MELINIQUE WALLS CASTELLANOS****
ABSTRACT
People of color are suffering and dying from COVID-19 at greater rates
than the general population. Additionally, population-level health interventions
can worsen health disparities by failing to reach already underserved
populations. In response, PrepareSTL, a collaborative, community-led
campaign, aims to reach communities of color in St. Louis with accessible
* Amanda Harris is the Director of Regional Initiatives at the St. Louis Regional Health
Commission in St. Louis, Missouri. She earned a Fulbright Scholarship in 2017 to study an
intercultural birthing initiative in northern Chile. She received her Bachelor of Arts from
Washington University in St. Louis in 2016.
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desires. As a creator, she holds many identities: community organizer, filmmaker, poet,
birthworker, curator, writer, cultural worker, ritualist, artist, and womanist. As a social
entrepreneur, Brittíni is the founder of Rebellyen, LLC, a consulting and wellness firm; serves as
the Organizing Director of the Black Healers Collective and InPower Institute; is a documentary
film director and producer; and is an international retreat host, and enjoys hosting meditation
gatherings.
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Worker (CHW) neighborhood leaders and more than 50 organizations to design a multi-faceted,
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regional, state, and national levels. She is simultaneously pursing her Doctor of Public Health at
the University of Illinois Chicago School of Public Health. Ciearra received her Master of Public
Health with a concentration in Prevention Science from Emory University, beginning her
educational career as a graduate from Howard University with a degree in Strategic, Legal and
Management Communications. Ciearra places her passion, and continues to grow her expertise, at
the intersection of public health and economic mobility, working to help transform institutions into
racially responsive systems that promote generational, community health and well-being.
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providing mentorship.
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information and resources to stop the spread of the coronavirus among the
target audiences and help these communities survive the virus’s adverse social
and economic impacts. This study (1) analyzes factors contributing to the
success of PrepareSTL as a community-led and equity-centered response to
COVID-19 and (2) identifies lessons from the campaign that could apply to other
public health initiatives. Semi-structured qualitative interviews and focus
groups were conducted with thirty-five individuals, including campaign
volunteers, canvassers, organizers, and executive leaders. Through a
combination of content and narrative analysis, the research team identified
several key strategies that led to the success of the campaign. These methods
included pairing broad media messaging with personal outreach, engaging
community champions as campaign messengers, centering relationships and
trusting Black and Brown leadership at all campaign levels, and creating a
highly responsive, community-driven management structure. Combined, these
factors allowed the campaign to not only respond to urgent COVID-19-related
needs, but also to build community outreach infrastructure to address ongoing
needs for communities of color in the St. Louis region.
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I. INTRODUCTION
National and regional data demonstrate that people of color suffer from
COVID-19 and its multidimensional consequences at greater rates than the
general population. 1 These pandemic-related health disparities compound on a
history of existing health disparities, as communities of color have long
experienced disproportionate morbidity and mortality from a variety of health
conditions. St. Louis, Missouri, is a metropolitan area in which both novel and
longstanding racial health disparities are particularly acute. 2 Therefore, it is vital
that the St. Louis public health response to COVID-19 prioritize the unique
pandemic-related needs of communities of color, while situating the response in
the larger goal of promoting racial equity.
PrepareSTL, a campaign spearheaded by community voice, recognizes the
urgency of prioritizing communities of color and other at-risk populations
through a COVID-19 public health response. 3 The campaign is a collaborative
effort of the City of St. Louis Health Department and St. Louis County
Department of Public Health, together with the St. Louis Regional Health
Commission, St. Louis Integrated Health Network, St. Louis Community Health
Worker Coalition, Alive and Well Communities, and the St. Louis Mental
Health Board. 4 Through a unified communications and outreach campaign,
PrepareSTL provides vital information and resources to disproportionately
impacted community members, specifically low-to-moderate income Black
residents and other people of color living in St. Louis City and County. 5 The
campaign utilizes grassroots canvassing, under the leadership of community
advocates, to deliver accurate and culturally responsive information and

1. Risk for COVID-19 Infection, Hospitalization, and Death by Race/Ethnicity, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/in
vestigations-discovery/hospitalization-death-by-race-ethnicity.html (last updated Feb. 18, 2021)
[hereinafter Risk by Race/Ethnicity].
2. Max Lyon, Reflection: Health Disparities in St. Louis, WASH. UNIV. PROSPER (June 19,
2019), https://sites.wustl.edu/prosper/reflection-health-disparities-in-st-louis/.
3. About, PREPARESTL, https://www.preparestl.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
4. Id.; “Community Health Workers (CHW) are members of the communities they serve.
CHWs empower people to engage in healthy behaviors that increase overall community
wellbeing…CHWs in St. Louis see their work as a movement to improve health and human
services, helping to transform policy and practice to be more receptive and responsive to
community needs.” CMTY. HEALTH WORKER COAL., ST. LOUIS REGIONAL STRATEGY TO VALUE
THE COMMUNITY HEALTH WORKER WORKFORCE: POLICY AND PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS
(Sept. 30, 2019) (on file with authors).
5. The Pulse of St. Louis, Interview with Angela Fleming Brown, CEO of St. Louis Regional
Health Commission, YOUTUBE (July 14, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cCcbIsvjnI
o&t=207s.
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resources. 6 Canvassers are also deeply engaged to do more than share
information and resources: they listen and drive the direction of the work.
During a pandemic, urgent community needs emerge, while systemic, longterm issues grow. 7 In response to this unique combination of needs, PrepareSTL
seeks to use its community engagement infrastructure to rapidly respond to
COVID-19, while simultaneously addressing potential long-term consequences
from the pandemic. 8 Canvassers, representing larger community voices, have
identified specific resources and knowledge that would positively impact
communities of color in the wake of COVID-19. 9 This community-driven
process offers immense learning opportunities for future grassroots advocacy
and public health work moving forward.
Before evaluating the PrepareSTL campaign in this Article, we provide
additional background and context. Part II outlines COVID-19 racial disparities
in the St. Louis region and explicitly connects the disparities to social
determinants of health. It also looks at how structural racism reveals itself in the
St Louis health care system. Part III outlines best practices for equity-centered
public health campaigns to provide a foundation for evaluating the PrepareSTL
campaign. Part IV describes the PrepareSTL campaign—from origin to
execution. Part V describes the results of our qualitative research study,
highlighting the strategies utilized to reach communities of color with public
health education and resources.
II. THE COMPOUNDING ROLES OF RACIAL DISPARITIES, SOCIAL
DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, AND STRUCTURAL RACISM
A.

COVID-19 Racial Disparities and Social Determinants of Health

At a national level, people of color are disproportionately likely to
experience severe or fatal cases of COVID-19. In July 2020, six months after
the first reported COVID-19 case in the country, the age-adjusted COVID-19
hospitalization rate among non-Hispanic Native American and Black people was
five times that of non-Hispanic White people, while the rate among
Hispanic/Latinx people was four times that of non-Hispanic White people.10
6. See Mark Schlinkmann, New Publicity Effort on Coronavirus Aims at Black Residents in
St. Louis, St. Louis County, STL TODAY (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.stltoday.com/...navirus-aimsat-black-residents-in-st-louis-st-louis-county/article_095e54e4-e416-5231-a3f3-ed8b703e
18dc.html.
7. See COVID-19 Pandemic Highlights Longstanding Health Inequities in the U.S., HARV.
T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/hsph-in-the-news/covid19-pandemic-highlights-longstanding-health-inequities-in-u-s/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
8. The Pulse of St. Louis, supra note 5.
9. Id.
10. Laboratory Confirmed COVID-19-Associated Hospitalization, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION COVID-NET, https://gis.cdc.gov/grasp/COVIDNet/COVID19_3.html
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Later, in February 2021, non-Hispanic Black people were 1.1 times more likely
to be infected and 2.9 times more likely to be hospitalized with COVID-19 than
non-Hispanic, White people. 11 Black people have also been more likely to die
from COVID-19 than the general population, with Black Americans accounting
for twenty-three percent of COVID-19 deaths in the United States in July 2020,
despite being only twelve percent of the population. 12 In February 2021, Black,
non-Hispanic Americans represented fifteen percent of the deaths. 13
These national disparities are mirrored at the local level. St. Louis has been
a hotspot of the epidemic in Missouri. St. Louis City and St. Louis County, in
which twenty-one percent of Missouri’s population reside, accounted for
twenty-nine percent of statewide cases in July 2020 and fourteen percent of the
cases in February 2021. 14 In July 2020, Black people experienced rates of
COVID-19 infection two and three times greater than their White counterparts
in St. Louis City and County, respectively. 15 In St. Louis City, this rate dropped
to 1.3 in February 2021. 16 Coinciding with their disproportionate rate of
infection, Black St. Louisans were twice as likely as their White counterparts to
die from COVID-19 in July 2020. 17 In 2021, Black people were 1.2 and 1.6 times
more likely than their White counterparts to die from COVID-19 in St. Louis
City and County, respectively. 18 From the two sets of data points, taken in July
2020 and February 2021, the rate of racial disparity in COVID-19 infection and
fatality has decreased both nationally and regionally, but still remains
significant.
(from the “View Rates by” dropdown menu, select “Race/Ethnicity”) (last visited Apr. 21, 2021)
[hereinafter COVID-NET].
11. Risk by Race/Ethnicity, supra note 1.
12. Weekly Updates by Select Demographic and Geographic Characteristics, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION fig.1, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/covid_weekly/in
dex.htm#Race_Hispanic (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
13. Id. at tbl.1.
14. Metrics by Test Date, MO. DEP’T OF HEALTH & SENIOR SERVS., https://health.mo.gov
/living/healthcondiseases/communicable/novel-coronavirus/data/data-download.php (click the
“Metrics by Test Date by County” tab on the data table, and on the “Metrics by Test Date” tab to
see county data and state data by date, respectively) (last visited June 4, 2021); Quick Facts:
Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/MO (last visited July 3,
2021).
15. See COVID-19 Demographic Data, CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MO., https://web.archive.org/web
/20200706232230/https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/covid-19/data/demographics.cfm (last visited July
6, 2020) [hereinafter COVID-19 Data, July 6, 2020]; ST. LOUIS CNTY. PUB. HEALTH, COVID-19
TRENDS IN ST. LOUIS COUNTY 7 (July 23, 2020).
16. See COVID-19 Demographic Data, CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MO., https://web.archive.org/web
/20210222235823/https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/covid-19/data/demographics.cfm (last visited Feb.
22, 2021) [hereinafter COVID-19 Data, Feb. 22, 2021].
17. COVID-19 Data, July 6, 2020, supra note 15.
18. See COVID-19 Data, Feb. 22, 2021, supra note 16; COVID-19 Statistics, ST. LOUIS CNTY.
CARES, https://stlcorona.com/resources/covid-19-statistics/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
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One factor that contributes to these higher rates of illness and death from
COVID-19 in communities of color is disparities in chronic diseases.
Disproportionately elevated rates of chronic diseases, like asthma and heart
disease, among Black St. Louisans mean that those infected with the virus are
more likely to experience severe illness. 19 In St. Louis County, Black residents
are two times as likely as White residents to have obesity, 1.75 times as likely
to have been diagnosed with diabetes, and 1.5 times as likely to die from heart
disease 20—all conditions strongly associated with increased risk of COVID-19
hospitalization or death. 21
To understand disparities in COVID-19 outcomes, we must look beyond
health conditions and look deeper into racial disparities throughout society. In
Missouri and at the national level, Black Americans are disproportionately likely
to work in the front-line businesses of grocery and drug stores, public transit,
shipping, janitorial services, health care, and social services. 22 Black households
also own fewer vehicles per household than White households, 23 and Black
adults are three times as likely as White adults to take public transit regularly. 24
These socioeconomic factors—also called social determinants of health due to
their direct impact on individual and population health 25—combine to make
social distancing more difficult, thereby putting people of color at greater risk
during a pandemic.
Furthermore, social determinants of health limit access to health and health
care. To understand the link between social disparities and poor health
outcomes, consider the example of access to housing. Black St. Louisans today
are disproportionately likely to live in neighborhoods with concentrated poverty,
limited access to grocery stores, and higher rates of pollutants. 26 In the City of
St. Louis, due to limited access to grocery stores and transportation, Black
19. See People with Certain Medical Conditions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-withmedical-conditions.html (last updated Mar. 29, 2021).
20. JASON PURNELL ET AL., WASH. UNIV. IN ST. LOUIS & ST. LOUIS UNIV., FOR THE SAKE
OF ALL 48–49 (2014).
21. People with Certain Medical Conditions, supra note 19.
22. HYE J. RHO ET AL., A BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF WORKERS IN FRONTLINE
INDUSTRIES 3–4 (2020).
23. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., Household Travel in America, in 2010
STATUS OF THE NATION’S HIGHWAYS, BRIDGES, AND TRANSIT: CONDITIONS AND PERFORMANCE
4 (2010).
24. Monica Anderson, Who Relies on Public Transit in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7,
2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/07/who-relies-on-public-transit-in-theu-s/.
25. NCHHSTP Social Determinants of Health, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/socialdeterminants/index.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2021).
26. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, EQUITY INDICATORS: TOWARD A ST. LOUIS REGION THAT WORKS
FOR US ALL 109, 137, 146 (2018).
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residents are almost twice as likely as White residents to have limited access to
healthy food. 27 Additionally, due to inadequate housing, higher rates of air
pollutants, and building demolitions in Black neighborhoods, Black children in
St. Louis City are 2.4 times more likely than White children to test positive for
lead in their blood. 28 Furthermore, higher rates of mold and pollutants help
explain why Black children in St. Louis visit the emergency room for asthma
approximately ten times more each year than White children. 29 As illustrated in
these examples, housing is not just a place to live. It also directly impacts a
person’s access to resources, such as grocery stores, health care, and exercise
opportunities, as well as one’s exposure to harm, such as pollution and violent
crime. 30 These social and environmental factors combine to put Black
individuals at greater risk of disease and illness.
B.

Structural Racism in the St. Louis Health Care System

While the concept of social determinants of health can help explain the
disparate COVID-19 outcomes, structural racism explains the way society
systemically creates, maintains, and exacerbates these racial disparities.
Structural racism is defined by social epidemiologist Nancy Krieger as “the
totality of ways in which societies foster discrimination, via mutually reinforcing
systems of discrimination (e.g., in housing, education, employment, earnings,
benefits, credit, media, health care, criminal justice, etc.) that in turn reinforce
discriminatory beliefs, values, and distribution of resources.” 31
To better understand this concept, let us reconsider our example of housing
as a social determinant of health. Black St. Louisans did not arbitrarily end up
in poverty-stricken neighborhoods; rather, policies and systems intentionally
segregated the population. Segregation contributes to poverty by lowering home
values, limiting access to jobs and education, and decreasing investment in local
businesses. 32 The racial segregation that characterizes St. Louis today is a
product of racially restrictive property deeds through the 1940s, redlining
through the 1960s, and private contracts among homeowners through the
1970s. 33 In St. Louis, where majority Black and majority White zip codes differ
27. Id. at 146.
28. RHONDA BARTOW, CITY OF ST. LOUIS DEP’T OF HEALTH, CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING
IN ST. LOUIS CITY 12 (2018).
29. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, supra note 26, at 37.
30. Id. at 149.
31. Nancy Krieger, Discrimination and Health Inequities, 44 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVS. 643,
650 (2014).
32. Jason Q. Purnell et al., For the Sake of All: Civic Education on the Social Determinants of
Health Disparities in St. Louis, 53 URB. EDUC. 711, 723–24 (2018).
33. NANCY CAMBRIA ET AL., SEGREGATION IN ST. LOUIS: DISMANTLING THE DIVIDE 22–23
(2018). Redlining describes a practice in which Black neighborhoods were barred from receiving
federal housing aid on the basis of race. Id.
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in life expectancy by up to eighteen years, 34 dramatic health disparities have no
single cause; rather, they are the result of multiple generations of structural
racism throughout different aspects of society.
As public health campaigns succeed or fail based on their ability to earn
community trust, a critical step in analyzing the success of a campaign is to
understand how it addresses barriers to trust. 35 At a national level, welldocumented distrust of health institutions within the Black community exists in
the context of structural racism and horrific examples of medical abuse. 36 In the
1800s, enslaved men and women were used without consent in medical
experimentation ranging from gynecological surgery to vaccine development to
heat tolerance experiments. 37 In the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Trial, the
United States Public Health Service recruited Black men into a natural history
syphilis study by falsely stating that they would receive treatment. 38 Subjects
were then denied treatment for twenty years following the discovery of curative
penicillin. 39 In light of this history, Black people today are disproportionately
reluctant to enroll in clinical trials, citing in part the fear of being treated like
“guinea pigs.” 40 Furthermore, perceptions of present-day medical mistreatment
are supported by findings that Black patients are less likely to receive
appropriate treatments including cardiac medication, coronary artery bypass
surgery, hemodialysis, and kidney transplantation. 41 These disparities persist
even after controlling for income, insurance status, and comorbidities. 42 Black

34. Purnell et al., supra note 32, at 730.
35. See, e.g., Sean Cahill et al., Stigma, Medical Mistrust, and Perceived Racism May Affect
PrEP Awareness and Uptake in Black Compared to White Gay and Bisexual Men in Jackson,
Mississippi and Boston, Massachusetts, 29 AIDS CARE 1351, 1357 (2017).
36. See, e.g., M.W. Wachterman et al., Mistrust, Misperceptions, and Miscommunication: A
Qualitative Study of Preferences About Kidney Transplantation Among African Americans, 47
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 240, 245 (2015); Leslie B. Adams et al., Medical Mistrust and
Colorectal Cancer Screening Among African Americans, 42 J. CMTY. HEALTH 1044, 1058 (2017);
Derek M. Griffith et al., Social and Cultural Factors Influence African American Men’s Medical
Help Seeking, 21 RSCH. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 337, 343 (2011).
37. See, e.g., Diana E. Axelsen, Women as Victims of Medical Experimentation: J. Marion
Sims’ Surgery on Slave Women, 1845-1850, SAGE, Fall 1985, at 10, 10; Annette Dula, African
American Suspicion of the Healthcare System Is Justified: What Do We Do About It?, 3
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 347, 347–48 (1994).
38. Allan M. Brandt, The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, THE HASTINGS CTR. REP., Dec.
1978, at 21, 24.
39. Id. at 21.
40. Yvonne Harris et al., Why African Americans May Not Be Participating in Clinical Trials,
88 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 630, 632 (1996).
41. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL
AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 2–3 (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003).
42. Id.
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patients face a history of medical mistreatment, difficulty accessing the health
care system, and difficulty obtaining satisfactory treatment within it. 43
St. Louis shares the nation’s bleak history perpetuating structural racism. In
St. Louis, unequal health care treatment on the basis of race is illustrated
throughout the segregated history of the city’s safety net. In the 1920s–30s,
Black patients were treated at City Hospital #2, a substandard facility suffering
from overcrowding, underfunding, and a racial hierarchy in which an all-White
physician team treated the Black patient population. 44 In contrast, impoverished
White patients were treated at City Hospital #1, a facility with double the perpatient spending as City Hospital #2. 45 From the 1940s–70s, conditions
improved for Black patients following the opening of Black-managed Homer G.
Phillips Hospital in North St. Louis. 46 Health outcomes, however, still lagged
behind the White population. 47 This was attributed to a combination of social
factors and funding disparities. Homer G. Phillips Hospital spending was thirty
percent less per patient than its White counterpart City Hospital #1.48 Private
hospitals at the time were inaccessible or unwelcoming to Black patients. 49
Despite its high regard and success providing culturally sensitive care,
Homer G. Phillips Hospital suffered financial strain in the 1960s due to a
changing social landscape. 50 The City of St. Louis closed Homer G. Phillips
Hospital in 1979 despite community protests. 51 The closure of the hospital led
to a dearth of culturally competent medical care in Black neighborhoods, and
many patients fell through the cracks of the new system. In the twenty years
following the closure of Homer G. Phillips Hospital, Black patients were treated
at a series of financially insolvent hospitals staffed primarily by White
physicians, leading to concerns about quality of care. 52
When the final safety net hospital closed in 1997, low-income patients,
many of whom were Black, were directed to a combination of Federally
Qualified Health Centers for primary care needs and private hospitals for
inpatient care. 53 While this system has enabled access to care for some, for those
43. Id. at 131–32.
44. Daniel R. Berg, A History of Health Care for the Indigent in St. Louis: 1904-2001, 48 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 191, 194 (2003).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 196–97.
47. Id. at 197.
48. Id. at 197–98.
49. Blythe Bernhard, Medical Researchers Work to Build Trust with African-Americans to
Take Part in Clinical Trials, STL TODAY (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local
/metro/medical-researchers-work-to-build-trust-with-african-americans-to-take-part-in-clinicaltrials/article_a41e7732-ed82-5d6b-b600-8482ad943bc8.html.
50. Berg, supra note 44, at 198–99.
51. Id. at 201.
52. Id. at 214–15.
53. Id. at 216–17.
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without health insurance, medical care frequently came—and still comes—at the
cost of financial ruin. 54 Furthermore, specialty care services often have long wait
times for the disproportionately Black low-income population, and interprovider care has often been disjointed. 55 These problems persist in present-day
St. Louis, with twenty-nine percent of working-age Black adults lacking health
insurance and few primary care providers located in majority Black
neighborhoods. 56 This local and national history of structural racism within the
health care system sheds light on the immense barriers public health campaigns
face to reach communities of color.
III. BEST PRACTICES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH CAMPAIGNS
Despite having good intentions, population-level health interventions
sometimes worsen existing health disparities by failing to reach already
underserved populations. Several interventions to promote cancer screening,
infant survival, and smoking cessation not only failed to improve existing
disparities but exacerbated them. 57
To prevent worsening health disparities, public health campaigns should
utilize an equity framework when selecting their target population, paying
special attention to which populations suffer from a condition or health problem
disproportionately. Furthermore, campaigns targeting low-income populations
of color need to consider the unique needs of their target population. In this
section, we review past campaigns targeting Black communities and describe
some of the common factors that helped them earn the trust of their target
populations.
Successful campaigns seek input from their target communities in the
earliest stages of campaign design. In a nationwide breastfeeding promotion
campaign focused on Black women, focus groups provided key insights to refine
both messaging and target population. 58 As nearly all participants endorsed the
belief that breastfeeding was “ideal,” but that formula was “good enough,”
campaign directors determined that messaging focused on the virtues of
breastfeeding would be insufficient and that it would be more effective to correct
54. Id. at 217.
55. Berg, supra note 44, at 217.
56. PURNELL ET AL., supra note 20, at 56–57.
57. See e.g., Steven J. Katz & Timothy P. Hofer, Socioeconomic Disparities in Preventive
Care Persist Despite Universal Coverage: Breast and Cervical Cancer Screening in Ontario and
the United States, 272 JAMA 530 (1994); DANA SCHULTZ ET AL., RAND CORP., EXAMINING
INTERVENTIONS TO ADDRESS INFANT MORTALITY IN ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 2–3
(2020); Tiffany C. Veinot et al., Good Intentions Are Not Enough: How Informatics Interventions
Can Worsen Inequality, 25 J. AM. INFORMATICS ASS’N 1080, 1081 (2018).
58. Anne Merewood & Jane Heinig, Efforts to Promote Breastfeeding in the United States:
Development of a National Breastfeeding Awareness Campaign, 20 J. HUM. LACTATION 140, 140
(2004).
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misconceptions about formula. 59 The focus groups also refined the intended
audience: while mothers were the primary decision-makers, they described
breastfeeding limitations imposed by employers, hospital staff, and daycare
providers; therefore, the general community was determined to be an appropriate
campaign audience. 60 In another study, researchers used focus groups among
Black men who have sex with men to identify knowledge gaps and barriers to
obtaining HIV pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP). 61 The majority of participants
had never heard of PrEP and many expressed concerns about side effects,
highlighting clear educational objectives for a future prevention campaign. 62 As
these examples show, campaigns targeting Black populations should ensure
appropriate messaging by seeking community input on the needs, decisionmakers, and baseline knowledge of the community.
Health campaigns must also select an appropriate medium in which to
convey messages. Helpfully, media consumption patterns unique to the Black
community provide an opportunity for successful health messaging. Radio is one
such medium: one market research study found that ninety-two percent of Black
consumers over the age of twelve listen to the radio each week. 63 In a population
of low-income Black women in Georgia, radio messaging alone increased
mammography rates by twenty percent, while radio combined with print media
increased mammography by forty-six percent. 64 A study on recruiting
techniques for smoking cessation among Black people had the greatest
numerical success with radio recruitment out of a mixed campaign including
radio, television, newspaper, and face-to-face recruiting methods. 65 However,
subjects recruited via radio reported higher incomes and greater readiness to quit
smoking compared to subjects recruited face-to-face, and so multiple
approaches may be necessary to reach the widest possible audience. 66
Furthermore, mass media campaigns tend to be more effective at education
than at behavioral change, a finding that highlights a complementary role for
more personalized campaigns. 67 One such grassroots campaign involved door59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 141, 142.
Id. at 141.
Cahill et al., supra note 35, at 1352.
Id. at 1353.
ARBITRON, BLACK RADIO TODAY 2013: HOW AMERICA LISTENS TO RADIO EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 2 (2013).
64. Ingrid J. Hall et al., The African American Women and Mass Media (AAMM) Campaign
in Georgia: Quantifying Community Response to a CDC Pilot Campaign, 26 CANCER CAUSES &
CONTROL 787, 791 (2015).
65. Monica S. Webb et al., Recruiting African Americans Smokers into Prevention Research:
Relationships Between Recruitment Strategies and Participant Characteristics, 32 RSCH. NURSING
& HEALTH 86, 90–91 (2009).
66. Id. at 91.
67. Nick Cavill & Adrian Bauman, Changing the Way People Think About Health-Enhancing
Physical Activity: Do Mass Media Campaigns Have a Role?, 22 J. SPORTS SCI. 771, 787 (2004).
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to-door recruiting for neighborhood walking groups in a low-income Black
neighborhood. 68 Peer leaders recruited attendees from their social and
professional networks, and first-time participants were given promotional
materials to hang on their front doors. 69 The use of community members as
recruiters was identified as crucial to the success of the campaign. 70
Another recurring theme throughout successful campaigns was the need to
prominently feature Black voices. This served the dual purpose of increasing
perceived accessibility of the health care system and of portraying healthy
behaviors as an internal rather than external cultural norm. In focus groups
evaluating breast cancer messaging, participants consistently described the
importance of hearing stories of “women like us”—i.e., relatable, non-celebrity
Black women who had survived breast cancer. 71 Another campaign promoting
walking groups gave first-time participants calendars featuring photographs of
members of their community engaging in walks, a strategy to address the lack
of cultural norms around this form of exercise. 72 Similarly, Black survivors of
intimate partner violence strongly endorsed the option of a community health
navigator who had personally experienced violence, drug use, poverty, or
depression, expressing a trust of personal experience over formal credentials. 73
In light of these findings, campaigns featuring the words of doctors or public
health officials should also consider featuring Black patient voices.
A point of note: extra care should be taken to show positive depictions of
historically marginalized groups. Stigma around conditions such as mental
illness and HIV is a powerful deterrent to seeking needed health care, and it can
be particularly acute in Black communities, where patients live at the
intersection of racial and medical marginalization. 74 Campaigns targeted at
marginalized populations risk reinforcing negative stereotypes, as in the case of
an HIV prevention campaign featuring sexually explicit depictions of Black
68. Dawn K. Wilson et al., Qualitative Developmental Research Among Low Income African
American Adults to Inform a Social Marketing Campaign for Walking, INT’L J. BEHAV. NUTRITION
& PHYSICAL ACTIVITY, 2013, at 1, 12.
69. Id. at 13.
70. Id. at 2, 14.
71. Kimberly D. Leeks et al., Formative Development of a Culturally Appropriate
Mammography Screening Campaign for Low-Income African-American Women, 5 J. HEALTH
DISPARITIES RSCH. & PRAC., no. 3, 2012, at 42, 53.
72. Wilson et al., supra note 68, at 2, 12.
73. Christina Nicolaidis et al., “You Don’t Go Tell White People Nothing”: African American
Women’s Perspectives on the Influence of Violence and Race on Depression and Depression Care,
100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1470, 1473 (2010).
74. Katherine Quinn et al., Multiple Dimensions of Stigma and Health Related Factors Among
Young Black Men Who Have Sex with Men, 21 AIDS & BEHAV. 207, 208, 213 (2017). See also
Jennifer Alvidrez et al., The Relationship Between Stigma and Other Treatment Concerns and
Subsequent Treatment Among Black Mental Health Clients, 31 ISSUES MENTAL HEALTH NURSING
257, 258 (2010).
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models, which was criticized for the implication that Hispanic and Black people
“are the only ones having unprotected sex.” 75 In a separate HIV testing
campaign, messages intended to empower Black women were generally wellreceived; however, the exclusive use of Black models led to concerns about
racial stereotyping. 76 For campaigns addressing stigmatized medical conditions,
racially diverse images seem preferable to mitigate the risks of perpetuating
harmful stereotypes.
Finally, public health campaigns targeting Black people should take
advantage of the unique strengths of this community. Several campaigns have
drawn on the resource of Black religious communities to communicate
messaging in a culturally acceptable manner. 77 Another campaign took
advantage of positive images of Black women as “strong sisters” to promote
health responsibility. 78 Black communities are essential resources at every stage
of a campaign: a source of input in planning, a grassroots network for sharing
information, and a wealth of personal experience navigating the health care
system. In the face of the significant racial health disparities that exist in the
United States today, public health campaigns should direct culturally
appropriate programming towards the larger goal of promoting racial health
equity.
IV. PREPARESTL: A COMMUNITY-DRIVEN, EQUITY-CENTERED PUBLIC
HEALTH CAMPAIGN
A.

Conception of PrepareSTL

According to Rebeccah Bennett, Founder and Principal of Emerging
Wisdom, PrepareSTL was created between March 19 and March 21, 2020.
Earlier in March, Ciearra Walker, Steve Parish, and other members of the St.
Louis Community Health Worker Coalition discussed the need for information
on COVID-19 to be shared with Black residents and others who would likely be
disproportionately impacted by its adverse effects.
The St Louis Community Health Worker Coalition is a regional asset
positioned at the crossroad of community health and community advocacy.
Members provide specialized expertise on the local community and “lived
75. Lance C. Keene et al., #PrEP4Love: Success and Stigma Following Release of the First
Sex-Positive PrEP Public Health Campaign, 23 CULTURE, HEALTH & SEXUALITY 1, 1–2, 3, 4
(2021).
76. Jennifer D. Uhrig et al., Perceived Message Effectiveness to Evaluate Updated Concepts
for a National HIV Testing Campaign for African American Women, 10 J. COMMC’N HEALTHCARE
205, 209–10 (2017).
77. See e.g., Wilson et al., supra note 68; Floyd Thompkins Jr. et al., A Culturally Specific
Mental Health and Spirituality Approach for African Americans Facing the COVID-19 Pandemic,
12 PSYCH. TRAUMA: THEORY, RSCH., PRAC., & POL’Y 455, 456 (2020).
78. Uhrig et al., supra note 76, at 207.
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experience” to develop community interventions that address structural
determinants resulting in violence, poverty, and racism. 79 The pandemic proved,
unwaveringly, the need for this group to center its neighbors, as they are skilled
at presenting culturally responsive, innovative solutions through collective
visioning. Seeing an opportunity to build trust within their local communities,
Coalition members encouraged one another to take the conversations from their
meetings to harness greater support for COVID-19 response efforts in the region.
On March 19, 2020, Steve reached out to Rebeccah and Bethany JohnsonJavois, CEO of the Saint Louis Integrated Network, to discuss the possibility of
community-wide action. Bethany and Rebeccah spoke later that day about
robust community engagement and outreach, and they both contacted Laurna
Godwin, President of Vector Communications, before the evening’s end
regarding communications. That same night, Dr. Jason Purnell, at the time
Director of Washington University’s Health Equity Works, called Rebeccah
about helping to coordinate action among the City and County Health
Departments. A flurry of additional calls ensued over the next twenty-four hours.
Rebeccah took what she heard from these initial conversations and developed a
draft campaign strategy to launch the collaborative work, which she presented
at the first team meeting the morning of Saturday, March 21, 2020.
At the meeting on March 21, all of the campaign’s sponsoring organizations
were at the table except the City of St. Louis Health Department (which was
kept in the loop by Angela Brown, CEO of the St. Louis Regional Health
Commission) and the St. Louis Mental Health Board (which joined the team
later in the spring). During this meeting, the campaign clarified their target
audiences: primarily low-to-moderate income Black and foreign-born
community members. Participants also established that the campaign would
have two goals: 1) stop the spread of the coronavirus among the target audiences
and 2) help these communities survive the virus’s adverse social and economic
impacts.
The campaign also assigned consultants and staff from the sponsoring
organizations to plan and undertake immediate public health information and
engagement actions. The operational model was still in development, but leaders
agreed that the campaign needed strong communications and robust on-theground community engagement. Furthermore, they decided to begin working in
North St. Louis City and County––where the convergence of racism, poverty,
and viral infections would amplify disparity and hardship.
PrepareSTL did not begin with contracts or memoranda of understanding.
There were no dedicated budgets or external community mandates. Even
dedicated attention was lacking from public health partners, who were
scrambling to respond to the emerging pandemic. The campaign rose out of
79. See CHW Workforce Partnership, ST. LOUIS INTEGRATED HEALTH NETWORK,
https://stlouisihn.org/chw-workforce-partnership/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2021).
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unwavering commitment from non-profit leaders, public health practitioners,
community health workers, community organizers, and community members
(referenced by the campaign team as community champions), who collectively
directed resources and energy to the most impacted residents in the region.
B.

Organizational Structure of PrepareSTL

PrepareSTL’s organizational backbone consists of seven sponsoring
agencies (St. Louis Regional Health Commission, St. Louis Integrated Health
Network, St. Louis Community Health Worker Coalition, Alive & Well
Communities, St. Louis Mental Health Board, City of St. Louis Department of
Health, and St. Louis County Department of Public Health Department), two
consultants (Emerging Wisdom and Vector Communications), and one
operating partner (The T). 80
The campaign leadership is composed of mostly women and majority Black,
Brown, and indigenous individuals. 81 PrepareSTL is organized around three
primary working groups: the large, overall campaign group; a subset
communications team; and a subset community organizing team. 82 The large
group consists of approximately thirty participants, who represent sponsoring
agency representatives, consultants, and team leaders from the campaign’s
operating partner. This team initially set the direction for the campaign, though
it later came to occupy a more passive role as its sub-committees planned and
executed bodies of work.
Additionally, the communications team develops and manages messaging,
collateral materials, public relations, and social media platforms. The organizing
team includes eight sponsoring agency representatives (from the City and
County Health Departments, Alive & Well Communities, Saint Louis Integrated
Health Network, and Community Health Worker Coalition) and four
engagement consultants, who provide expert knowledge and skills in strategy,
community organizing, and medicine. Of note, the representatives of the
sponsoring agencies are community consultants and community health workers,
who represent the communities and neighborhoods they serve. The organizing
team conducts community outreach, as well as generates and implements
community solutions in response to emerging on-the-ground needs and requests.
These efforts include the management of canvassers and the strategic planning
for neighborhood outreach.
The meeting structure has varied, but from March to October 2020,
PrepareSTL teams met daily to respond to the urgent needs of the community
80. Annex 1, List of Sponsoring Organizations, Funders, and Partners for PrepareSTL
[hereinafter List of Sponsors] (on file with authors).
81. The Pulse of St. Louis, supra note 5.
82. See generally PREPARESTL, COMMUNITY OUTREACH & ENGAGEMENT EARLY MAY
UPDATE 1 (2020) [hereinafter COMMUNITY OUTREACH].
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and constantly shifting landscape. Only in November 2020, did the organizing
team adjust its meeting structure to be weekly.
C. Partnerships and Funders of PrepareSTL
Ten funders, including foundations, hospital systems, and other coalitions,
contributed a total of $1,352,900 to PrepareSTL. 83 Twelve additional donors,
including departments of health, hospital systems, and other organizations,
provided in-kind donations of personal protective equipment (PPE) including
244,000 masks, 14,000 gloves, and 380 bottles of hand sanitizer. 84
PrepareSTL also worked with 160 community partners to execute its
community engagement and outreach efforts. 85 Partners have come from the
public, non-profit, faith, grassroots, and private sectors; they include a wide
range of organizations, efforts, and interests. The following types of partners
contributed to the campaign: grassroots community groups and organizations,
early childhood education groups, immigrant service providers, government
agencies, churches, social service providers, health care providers, public school
districts, area businesses, voter and census engagement efforts, youth
development organizations, and advocates for people who are unhoused. 86
D. A Review of PrepareSTL’s Evolving Community Outreach Model
PrepareSTL’s community outreach model consists of three main
components: “public health education, community action, and economic
relief.” 87 The model provides reliable and accessible information about the virus,
distributes PPE to prevent community spread, and offers financial support to
canvassers involved in the campaign. 88 Together, these strategies heighten
public awareness about preventing the spread of COVID-19 and help
community members navigate the multidimensional hardships related to the
pandemic. 89 This model adopts a “triple bottom line of positive impacts that
simultaneously advances heightened public awareness, community protection,
and income support.” 90
1. Public Health Education
Communications efforts fell into three categories with specific actions
planned and executed in each category: public relations (TV features and

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

List of Sponsors, supra note 80.
Id.
Id.
Id.
COMMUNITY OUTREACH, supra note 82.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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advertising, print features, donated advertising, radio blitzes, radio features, and
radio spots), electronic and social media (Facebook page, YouTube channel, and
a campaign website available in ten languages), and hardcopy materials
(including the dissemination of 50,000 direct mailers, collateral materials such
as educational flyers in nine language translations, laminated posters, 1000 yard
signs, twenty sandwich boards, and banners for community events). The
communications team engaged with the following outlets to amplify the
message: KSDK, KPLR, Bounce TV, KTVI, KMOV (television), Premion (over
the top advertising), St. Louis American, NorthSider, Southsider, La Tremenda,
Red Latina, Bosnian Media Group, iHeart Radio, Radio One, RealSTL News,
Own Your Now Show, and The Pascal Show. 91
2. Community Action
PrepareSTL’s community action has relied on street canvassing to reach
residents at a neighborhood-level. Conventional canvassing includes “direct
contact with individuals around issues and topics of interest.” 92 The pandemic
necessitated a new way of canvassing; PrepareSTL developed a public presence
in targeted neighborhoods while respecting social distancing requirements. 93
PrepareSTL canvassers, trained community champions “who reflect, live, and
work in the communities being canvassed,” distributed public health
information to community hot spots (highly trafficked neighborhood locals). 94
They posted flyers, distributed collateral, answered questions from residents and
business owners, and gave out PPE kits, which included “some combination of
cloth and/or surgical masks, mask instruction cards, paper bags for
decontamination, alcohol wipes, fever strips, vitamin C chewables, and
PrepareSTL flyers.” 95 Canvassers, many of whom faced financial hardship
during the pandemic, received compensation for their contributions in the form
of a $360 Visa gift card. 96
The community action campaign consisted of three main phases: COVID
outbreak (March–May 2020), immigration outreach and regional shutdown and
reopening amid summer protests (June–July 2020), and the cloth mask campaign
(August–December 2020). 97 Across the three phases, PrepareSTL distributed
91. List of Sponsors, supra note 80.
92. COMMUNITY OUTREACH, supra note 82.
93. Id.; PrepareSTL Tries to Slow the Spread of COVID-19 in High-Poverty Zip Codes, ST.
LOUIS AM. (Apr. 15, 2020), http://www.stlamerican.com/your_health_matters/covid_19/preparestl-tires-to-slow-the-spread-of-covid-19-in-high-poverty-zip-codes/article_5ed2e5a8-7a6b-11ea95f6-87135fe58947.html.
94. COMMUNITY OUTREACH, supra note 82.
95. Id.; Outreach, PREPARESTL, https://www.preparestl.com/campaign/ (last visited Apr. 20,
2021) [hereinafter Outreach].
96. COMMUNITY OUTREACH, supra note 82.
97. Id.
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approximately 300,000 cloth and surgical masks. Approximately 183 canvassers
distributed masks in 70 street and mobile canvasses, reaching 683 community
hot spots. Additionally, 31 of the street team canvassers were either foreign born
or served immigrant and refugee communities. Hot spots included heavy foot
traffic and high visibility locations, such as grocery stores, gas stations, beauty
supply stores, convenience stores, pharmacies, health centers, laundromats,
liquor stores, check cashing stores, schools, early childhood education centers,
and public and senior housing complexes. 98 The campaign hosted four mask
give-away events, which brought in 891 attendees and provided tests to 116
people, while also supporting 41 community-led mask give-away events. In
addition to canvassing, hosting, and supporting community events, PrepareSTL
also carried out bulk, targeted PPE distribution to municipalities, neighborhood
hubs, and other social service partnerships. 99 In total, PrepareSTL assembled
and distributed 100,000 PPE kits.
3. Economic Relief
PrepareSTL paid community champions (also referenced as canvassers) to
canvass target zip codes and community hot spots, provide unhoused outreach,
and assemble PPE kits. From April through December 2020, PrepareSTL
partnered with 213 community champions and dispensed $150,000 in direct
financial support, which included not only the standard canvasser honoraria, 100
but also hardship fund distributions for champions who suffered economic crises
and needed immediate, personal assistance.
The value of the financial support provided was confirmed early in the
initiative through a survey of champions. Sixty-four percent of those who
responded reported that they had experienced a loss in employment, reduction
in earnings, and economic instability as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. 101
V. EVALUATING PREPARESTL
This study does not comprehensively measure the success of PrepareSTL on
activating behavior change. The interviews with canvassers and volunteers
highlight knowledge increase and behavior change around preventative public
health measures, but residents in targeted neighborhoods were not surveyed at
large. Analyzing the success of PrepareSTL from a lens of measured behavior
change, such as increased mask usage or physical distancing, is an area
deserving of further investigation. While this study does not measure widespread
98. Id.
99. See Outreach, supra note 95.
100. Honoraria are payments made for a person’s professional services. Honorarium, Oxford
Learner’s Dictionaries, https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/honorarium
(last visited July 7, 2021).
101. COMMUNITY OUTREACH, supra note 82.
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adoption of public health practices, the regional rates of COVID-19 support the
equity-centered work of PrepareSTL. As explained in Part II of this Article in
greater detail, between July 2020 and February 2021, the St. Louis region saw a
decrease in racial disparities in rates of COVID-19 infection and fatality. 102
While no direct causation can be proven, PrepareSTL likely contributed to the
significant decline in racial disparity through its targeted, robust media and
outreach efforts.
This study aimed to understand the factors that contributed to the success of
PrepareSTL as a community-led and equity-centered response to COVID-19 to
leverage learnings for other public health initiatives. The interview questions
focused on the unique characteristics of PrepareSTL from the perspective of
those intimately involved with the campaign. 103 All questions were optional to
answer.
We conducted six semi-structured interviews and three semi-structured
focused groups, two with canvassers and one with executive leaders and
campaign organizers.
We conducted interviews and focus groups over Zoom with video. 104
Interviews lasted approximately one hour, and focus groups lasted two hours. 105
All three focus groups were conducted in December 2020, and interviews
occurred in December 2020 and January 2021.
The research team represents three organizations closely involved with the
PrepareSTL campaign: the St. Louis Regional Health Commission (two
researchers), Saint Louis Integrated Health Network, and Emerging Wisdom. 106
Two members of the research team also serve on the organizing team in
volunteer and consulting capacities. All four members of the research team were
present at focus groups and were involved in some interviews. The research team
prefaced each interview with a request for full transparency and an explanation
of the research’s confidentiality. 107

102. See infra Part II, at p. 4.
103. List of Sponsors, supra note 80.
104. Sidney Watson, Protocol: Lessons Learned from Community-Driven Responsiveness
during COVID-19 (unpublished IRB document) (on file with author).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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Interviewees included the following groups:
Interview group

Number of
interviewees

Description of interview group

PrepareSTL
volunteers

2

Those involved with the campaign
who did not receive compensation and
were not directly involved in the
planning or organizing of the
campaign.

PrepareSTL
canvassers

13

Community champions who
distributed PPE and educational
supplies to hot spots (businesses and
community centers in the targeted zip
codes). Canvassers participated in one
of two focus groups.

PrepareSTL
organizers

9

Those who lead the planning of the
PrepareSTL community outreach.
Organizers represent sponsoring
organizations and consultants. Seven
organizers participated in a focus
group, and two additional organizers
were individually interviewed.

Executive leaders

11

Leaders of the sponsoring
organizations who, as of August 2021,
continue to help advise the campaign
and secure funding. Eleven leaders
participated in one focus group; two of
these participants were also
interviewed individually.

Total number of
interviewees

35

We intended to interview an additional group of participants––owners of
community hot spots. 108 This perspective would have enabled the study to speak
to observed behavior change within targeted business hot spots and represent a
perspective less intimately involved with the operations of the campaign. We
reached out to multiple individuals and businesses but did not secure interviews
due to the study’s tight timeline and a lack of responsiveness from prospective
participants, likely stemming from competing priorities during a pandemic.

108. Id.
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We used a combination of content analysis and narrative analysis to interpret
the qualitative data. 109 Researchers coded and categorized responses based on
the specific aims of the study. 110
These interviews and focus groups allowed us to 1) analyze how the
PrepareSTL campaign expanded and tailored public health campaign best
practices to fit the needs of its target audience, 2) highlight distinguishing
characteristics of the campaign developed outside of the stated best practices, 3)
project long-term impacts of the campaign, and 4) identify campaign challenges.
A.

Expanding and Tailoring Public Health Campaign Best Practices
1. Targeted Campaign Focus

The PrepareSTL campaign has a clear focus to “[help] St. Louisans of color
prepare and prevail.” 111 This clear, equitable prioritization of resources is
noteworthy and helped contribute to the campaign’s ability to reach its target
audiences. One organizer mentioned that one of the campaign’s biggest impacts
“is the fearlessness of this group to center Black lives . . . . I don’t think that is
always done. And even if we want to do it as people of color, sometimes we get
nervous and concerned that folks might not fund us, folks might not
understand.” 112
The campaign’s focus on people of color led to targeted strategies, such as
outreach in specific zip codes, formation of new partnerships to uplift preexisting relationships with immigrant and foreign-born communities, and proper
translation of select campaign materials into ten languages. One canvasser
commented on the importance of having materials in various languages: “When
we went to the south side, we had the different nationalities, where we were
passing out the [materials] in the different languages. That was cool, too,
because we were able to reach, you know, that set of people. They didn’t feel
ostracized, alienated, or feel compelled to have to conform to the English
language, especially during these stressful times.” 113 The campaign’s clear
commitment to equitable outreach should not be assumed or overlooked; it was
a critical factor to reach Black and foreign-born community members.
2. Multifold, Racially Responsive Communication Strategies
The PrepareSTL campaign used a multitude of communication strategies to
reach a broad yet targeted audience. As discussed in the background section, the
campaign employed a variety of outreach methods, including radio, television,
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Watson, supra note 104.
Id.
About, supra note 3.
Interview (Dec. 9, 2020).
Interview (Dec. 17, 2020).
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newspaper, and face-to-face recruitment. Combining diverse mass media
strategies with direct outreach has been shown by other campaigns to lead to
broad educational reach with a higher rate of behavioral change. 114 PrepareSTL
followed these campaign best practices, and multiple stakeholder groups
noticed.
An executive leader involved in the media campaign highlighted the
successful combination of using “direct person-to-person strategies and indirect
strategies (marketing and communications). One could not succeed really
without the other.” 115 Furthermore, the media materials followed another best
practice discussed in the background section: using racially diverse images and
positively depicting marginalized groups. When describing the media graphics,
one canvasser explained, “It was put out in a way that it was community.” 116
She further explained how the engaging, clear graphics allowed for broad
adoption: “It was very good to see that it was done in a very tasteful and
engaging way . . . . It was always communicated [for] community high-risk
groups, but it was for anyone and everyone who wanted the information and . . .
different demographics. It wasn’t just Black people sharing it. I saw other
people, other races sharing it.” 117
3. Engaging Community Champions
All stakeholder groups commented on the engagement of community
champions, particularly Black community leaders, to deploy information and
resources during outreach efforts. The background section elaborates on other
successful campaigns relying on community members as recruiters and featuring
Black voices as messengers of the information. To describe PrepareSTL’s
successful community outreach, one campaign volunteer described the effort as
“community educating the community.” 118 An executive leader added, “It’s a
different, different position . . . when it’s our people, right? And so, coming with
that posture of respect allows us to be able to listen and actually engage and
activate based on what we hear, rather than feeling as if we are the purveyors of
all truth . . . .” 119
The PrepareSTL outreach model for information-sharing and PPEdistribution was highlighted and highly regarded by all volunteer respondents.
One canvasser responded, “helping people get information and making sure
people’s lives are saved” 120 was her most meaningful contribution to the
114. See GWENN KUBECK, OR. STATE UNIV., PUBLIC OUTREACH AND BEHAVIOR CHANGE 3,
8, 9, 16 (2007).
115. Interview, supra note 112.
116. Interview, supra note 113.
117. Id.
118. Interview (Dec. 16, 2020).
119. Id.
120. Interview (Dec. 15, 2020).
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campaign. PrepareSTL demonstrated the ability to get information into the
community at the neighborhood level. “Collectively we were able to get
resources in the hands of under-resourced demographics and under-resourced
areas, you know, one could downplay you know the access to gloves and masks,
but . . . the fact that we were able to readily and easily get these into the hands
of people was huge,” 121 said a respondent.
During a focus group interview, canvassers reflected and applauded
themselves on the “necessary and meaningful” work they made in their own
communities. 122 “I see those posters everywhere. We canvassed . . . . I still go
to a place like oh . . . they were here,” said a campaign canvasser. 123 “People
who I hadn’t even, like, talked about the campaign with . . . knew what the
campaign was when they saw . . . my yard sign or something,” confirmed
another respondent. 124 “I think that that left a big emotional, big psychological
impact to show that, hey, we got us,” another respondent followed. 125 The
PrepareSTL model relies on neighbors helping neighbors; the community serves
as the campaign’s heartbeat.
4. Use of Plain Language
The campaign’s choice of language, graphics, and content mattered, too.
When the campaign launched, there was a high level of uncertainty about
COVID-19. Canvassers noticed how the campaign communicated science in
empowering, accessible ways, especially against the backdrop of confusion. One
canvasser explained, “Especially early on with the first outbreaks in St. Louis,
there’s a lot of . . . misinformation surrounding the novel coronavirus, and a lot
of that misinformation was also like racially charged . . . [PrepareSTL] really
kind of helped just simplify a lot of this uncertainty and crazy information
coming over from every angle.” 126
Four out of thirteen canvassers specifically called the communication
materials easy to understand. One canvasser explained, “[The PrepareSTL
materials were] very much in language that was understandable, easy to read.
Again, accessible is the word I keep using.” 127 A volunteer also commented on
the accessibility of the language: “[The communication] was written extremely
well for communities to help people understand.” 128 A simple example of
“choice language” highlights PrepareSTL’s intentionality with communications.
Instead of using the phrase “social distance,” PrepareSTL has always defined
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
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specific behaviors that reduce the spread of disease, such as, “[stay] at least six
feet from any people outside your household. That’s about two arms’ length.” 129
The clarity of this language more easily promotes behavior change.
B.

PrepareSTL’s Distinguishing Campaign Characteristics
1. Campaign’s Emphasis on Community Care

A canvasser expounded on the benefits from recruiting canvassers who
“were for and of the people” they served. 130 He mentioned that “what makes
PrepareSTL unique is knowing the commitment and a level of love that some of
the key contact folks have for people of African descent and other, you know,
people of color, marginalized populations.” 131 “And that authenticity . . . that
commitment, that love, trickled down, or was reflected in the canvassers.” 132
Furthermore, he explained:
[PrepareSTL] didn’t have this White savior feel to it. It was actually people that
are connected to the community, in some way, shape, form, or fashion. They
have a deep love for the community and love for their people. And I think that
those relational things . . . allow us to connect with the community deeper than
somebody from outside the community, that doesn’t really know about the
people, the culture, doesn’t have a vested interest in the community . . . . 133

Several canvassers and executives pointed to this notion of communal care
as a strong tool for continued engagement of community champions and a
critical factor for the campaign’s success. One canvasser succinctly summarized
this approach: “You know, a lot of us . . . [are] the people that do it from the
heart.” 134 Beyond the public health implications of the PrepareSTL campaign,
individuals shared a feeling of connectedness to community, with one canvasser
stating, “just the opportunity to share important resources in the space that I grew
up [in] and love was a great opportunity for me.” 135 Many other canvassers and
volunteers shared similar sentiments. One canvasser reported that the campaign
“help[ed] my children see that our communities do matter . . . and that we could
be out here spreading the word and taking care of our communities and making
sure they have the information that they needed.” 136

129. Social Distancing, PREPARESTL, https://www.preparestl.com/distancing/ (last visited
June 6, 2021).
130. Interview, supra note 121.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Interview, supra note 113.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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2. Economic Component of Community Care
While the campaign had an outward focus on community care for the most
vulnerable, it also employed that same care internally, as illustrated by the
economic support of canvassers. Campaigns traditionally rely on two primary
forms of human capital: a small number of paid long-term employees and a large
number of unpaid short-term volunteers. PrepareSTL took a unique approach:
the campaign engaged community members as short-term paid canvassers,
instead of as unpaid volunteers. This meant that people were well compensated
for their time, especially compared to the more common model of relying on
volunteer labor from community residents. “[T]hey took care of us, as well as
the community,” said a canvasser. 137 Another one continued, “so many people
were furloughed, losing their jobs.” 138 The difficult circumstances made the
economic compensation even more critical.
Additionally, canvassers were further supported with an emergency fund,
which could be accessed at any time for hardships. A canvasser stated that
“PrepareSTL also provided just resources for us, like as the canvassers, if we
needed something, if we needed to get a test, if we were struggling to pay our
rent, mortgage, utilities.” 139 The importance of this economic component of the
campaign was emphasized nearly a dozen times by executives, organizers, and
canvassers. This type of wrap-around economic support is largely a foreign
concept in traditional campaign organizing, but it is significant because it
provided a type of care for the canvassers emblematic of the collective
community care of the campaign.
Also mentioned was the need for organizational leaders to be compensated
for their invaluable contributions to the campaign. “I don’t think any of the
organizational table [members] are compensated for their time or their staff’s
time that they have provided to this initiative . . . . They need to be compensated
for this work,” stated an executive leader. 140 This can become an area of growth
as the campaign evolves and matures.
3. Relational Resourcing
The campaign’s strong network of organizations was mentioned by every
stakeholder group—executives, canvassers, volunteers, and organizers. One
executive leader explained, “This is an exceedingly well-networked group . . .
from on-the-street engagement of our unhoused neighbors . . . to foundation
presidents . . . .” 141 The campaign’s leadership has a “vast network of
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relationships that reach into nearly every aspect of civic and community life.” 142
This strong network aided the campaign in its ability to bring on additional
community partners, acquire seed money and sustain funding sources, and build
rapport in the community.
Six canvassers mentioned their desire to join the campaign because of the
organizations and leaders at the table. A volunteer also mentioned her
relationship with the sponsoring organizations as a key reason for trusting the
campaign: “Everyone that was involved were people that we had either worked
with, knew of, had, you know, great relationships with, and really trusted their
commitment and their work in the community.” 143 Executive leaders and
organizers also spoke to how pre-existing relationships with other sponsoring
organizations allowed the campaign to rapidly foster deep trust and commitment
to collaboration. One executive leader explained, “I don’t think it’s just
competence here, but I think it’s strong pre-existing and reinforcing of
relationships.” 144
4. Strong and Black Leadership
The strength of the campaign’s leadership team was more than its broad
network; the specific leaders at the table were critical. As previously explained,
PrepareSTL did not begin with contracts or a mandate. Community leaders,
including organizational executives and community health workers, conceived
of and launched PrepareSTL to ensure an equitable response to a devastating
pandemic. In describing the PrepareSTL leadership, one executive leader noted,
What we did have . . . is extraordinary talent with deep competency and
community credibility; an unrivaled leadership bench comprised of Black
women with institutional and organizational authority; . . . a willingness to act
with agility and urgency; an unwavering commitment to community/Black
folks’ well-being; and an absence of egos intent upon credit claiming and
political posturing. 145

These leadership characteristics helped guide the campaign’s success by
creating a culture of community responsiveness and collaboration. An organizer
explained, “I personally cannot envision doing this work without this team.” 146
Canvassers also spoke to the specific characteristics of the campaign’s
leadership. During a focus group, canvassers were asked: “How did having a
doctor present the information upfront impact the campaign?” 147 Five out of six

142. Memorandum from Rebeccah Bennett to Amanda Harris and Brittini Gray, Background
for PrepareSTL 2 (Jan. 5, 2021) (on file with author).
143. Interview, supra note 118.
144. Interview, supra note 112.
145. Memorandum, supra note 142.
146. Interview, supra note 112.
147. Interview, supra note 113.
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respondents spoke to the specific traits of the doctor (who helped prepare
canvassers to practice safety while doing outreach). One explained,
I really just want to emphasize the individuality of this particular doctor . . . it
goes again to like the right people. [This doctor] was exactly the right physician
. . . . [This doctor has] dedicated themselves and immerse[d] themselves in the
community, [and is] extremely passionate about this specific group, vulnerable
population . . . . You can’t just throw any ‘ole person in this position and expect
people to be responsive. 148

Another canvasser explained how having a Black doctor present the information
mattered:
I have to see somebody that looks like me or . . . I can’t always trust it. Like, I
just can’t because you don’t have the same experiences [as] me . . . if you
haven’t been through what I’ve been through. So, um, I was just happy to see
. . . they’re invested in the community. They’re knowledgeable, and . . .
Black. 149

The canvassers’ responses illustrate how the leadership team’s unique blend of
characteristics, including demonstrated commitment to community, helped lead
to the campaign’s success.
5. Organizing Team’s Radical Leadership and Management Style
Aside from the executive leadership of the campaign, the day-to-day work
of the campaign was managed by the organizing team. It was also the space
where relationships were built that reverberated throughout the campaign. The
love, the commitment, and the drive of the campaign rests in the radical
leadership structure of the organizing team. “Like I feel affirmed and I feel
uplifted when I leave the PrepareSTL table,” said an organizer. 150 Separately, a
canvasser stated that “building the capacity and the, I think, confidence of some
of the people on this team who are absolutely fabulous, in terms of folks who,
you know, had some, had passion, but hadn’t necessarily executed in this way
before” was an additional and unexpected opportunity provided by the
campaign. 151 In other words, the organizing team, with its expertise and passion,
tapped into the expertise and passion of all those it encountered, and the
campaign was better for it. An executive shared best the true authenticity of the
organizing team and its ability to reach the community, “[the] organizing team
has been all community leaders . . . leading the way, having the input, making
the decisions.” 152
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PrepareSTL took an assets-based approach to understand and harness the
strengths of the community to match the urgency necessitated by the pandemic.
PrepareSTL challenged the conventional way of working to match the
unprecedented circumstances that were affecting the region. Campaign
organizers committed to “go outside [the box] to change policies, I think, to not
stick with the attitude of we haven’t done it this way before.” 153 Partnership and
collaboration have been illustrated as core components to the PrepareSTL
campaign. “Here in St. Louis, you know, we organized and brought together the
community and I was a part of it. That makes me feel, like, really good,” said a
community canvasser. 154
Another key factor of success was the campaign’s management approach,
which combined flexibility with intense planning. Five of the twelve executives
interviewed commented on the fluidity of the campaign’s planning and
implementation. One executive leader stated, “having that willingness to be
organic and flexible has really helped this initiative to be able to be
responsive.” 155 This idea of flexibility and fluidity was expressed in several
ways by executive leaders, including the campaign’s willingness to listen, adapt,
and respond to community need and input. The canvassers more frequently
spoke to the high-level of organization of the campaign. Six out of the thirteen
canvassers specifically commented on the impressive organization of the
campaign when referencing the planning of the outreach efforts. While the
executive leaders mentioned the intense preparation needed to protect the health
of canvassers, they did not often comment on the organized nature of the
campaign. Combining the various stakeholders’ perspectives, a balance of
preparedness and adaptability appeared to lead the campaign to its successes.
6. Establishing a Highly Sensitive Feedback Loop
The strategy, co-developed by campaign executives and organizers,
provided a roadmap for the campaign. The organizing team then developed the
tactics and designed a process to meet the campaign’s strategic goals. The
organizing team subsequently trained and deployed canvassers (local
community members) to assist in carrying out the outlined tactics and specific
tasks. In addition to tracking the success of their work, the campaign facilitated
debrief sessions with canvassers on their activities within three days of their
deployment. This tight timeline allowed for relevant insights from the debrief to
be incorporated into the next activity of the campaign immediately, even in time
for the next canvass. This meant, if needed, the organizing team could refine the
tactics or realign the strategy with true community need. “After the first time I
went out and canvassed, you know, having a follow-up call, where we were able
153. Id.
154. Interview, supra note 121.
155. Interview, supra note 120.
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to give feedback/suggestions made me feel like I was able to add my voice to
the space,” said a canvasser. 156 Another stated, “I think they took some of those
[suggestions] in account because they started going out in the vans and doing
different things . . . . I think they listened and heard everything we were saying
in those breakout rooms and incorporated them.” 157
The work of PrepareSTL has challenged practitioners and organizers to
reimagine community partnerships and what it means to work together. “It’s like
an exemplar of what real radical collaboration can do to an organization,” said a
respondent. 158 The structure of the campaign “models how community leaders
can make effective decisions,” said a volunteer. 159 “The larger health systems
[need to] understand you need to partner with and listen to grassroots
organizations that have their ear to the ground, that have the trust in the
community,” said an executive leader. 160 “People are now valuing, respecting
the input, seeking it out, and looking to use it in a way that’s beneficial for
community change,” a stakeholder of the PrepareSTL campaign shared
excitedly. 161 The campaign’s pattern of defying traditional leadership and
organizational roles allowed it to amplify voices from the community.
C. Projected Long-Term Impacts
1. Personal Knowledge Increase Through Campaign Efforts
PrepareSTL not only increased widespread awareness, but it also promoted
learning and behavior change among the canvassing team. Every canvasser and
volunteer interviewed shared the personal tensions they experienced navigating
the onset and evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. Many respondents shared
their appreciation of PrepareSTL, and the way it has influenced and impacted
their personal behaviors. “Teaching me how to protect myself or how to protect
others around me, the hand washing, the hand sanitizer, wiping everything
down; just those little . . . things helped me,” said a canvasser. 162
Canvassers and volunteers spoke transparently about the hesitations and
mistrust they witnessed amongst family as well as the overwhelming amount of
misinformation that circulated in their networks. One canvasser demonstrated
how her engagement with the campaign promoted change in her own life and
her interactions with others. She shared how her knowledge from participating
in the campaign helped her explain the efficacy of the public health measures:
“being able to explain to a person why I have my mask on, why . . . me being
156.
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six feet apart from them shouldn’t offend them. Because I’m trying to protect
them.” 163 PrepareSTL created space for canvassers to be educated about
COVID-19 and work to adapt their behaviors. The campaign also gave space for
the community to be receptive. A communications expert for the campaign
shared this perspective: “You may not be able to change someone’s mind. But
if you introduce enough disruption to the existing narrative to make people think,
you might have a chance of allowing them to change their mind.” 164 Members
of the community who were once resistant to the suggested preventive measures,
like wearing a mask, might even become willing to reconsider their behaviors
with enough personal outreach.
2. Development of Community Infrastructure
The model of PrepareSTL stands as proof of concept. Community members
highlighted the need for the type of community organizing exemplified by
PrepareSTL, and COVID-19 supplied the urgency and singularity of
circumstances to permit the implementation of such a model. “I’d like to see
[PrepareSTL] in more places than just medical because I think they could benefit
from the way you guys run things and do things and you know conquer a
problem and move on to the next,” said a respondent. 165
The PrepareSTL model includes a diverse collaborative that has built a
foundation of practice to span well beyond public health. PrepareSTL was “able
to use our resourcing to help build up more community-based infrastructure,
specifically at The T,” said a respondent. 166 “What else are things that we need
to be prepared for and how can we conquer those as a community, and I think
that’s where the longevity will come from, I think there will be new things for
St. Louis to be prepared for,” said a respondent. 167 Stakeholders mentioned
social issues like community safety, gun violence, education, economic
development, public policy and more, all as areas that could benefit from a
model like that of PrepareSTL. “Oh, I think [PrepareSTL] doesn’t go away. I
think that, you know, it moves into another phase,” said a respondent. 168
PrepareSTL also provided tools and experience to activate a group of
community champions. Canvassers and campaign organizers spoke to their
personal and professional development participating in the campaign. “It
encourages me to want to go out, and do more education, community health,
education and kind of go from there,” said a canvasser. 169 A campaign organizer
said:
163.
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This has been an opportunity to be able to learn how those tables work. To be
able to sit down and be around powerful people, with powerful voices, who
make impacts in ways that I’m just learning how to do . . . . Now, me having an
opportunity to sit at some of these tables where some of these decisions [are
made]. These decisions affect the people that I live with and care for. It has been
a transition. 170

Multiple canvassers expressed their eagerness and preparedness to stay involved
in community action.
Furthermore, several interview respondents noted that relationships grew
out of this campaign, encouraging and enabling opportunities for future
collaboration. “The relationships that have been developed from this work . . .
[are] also extremely, extremely heartening for me.” 171 Both personally and
professionally, PrepareSTL centered people. “When my community is healthy,
I can be healthy. When my family is healthy, I can be healthy,” was a mindset
shared by the people doing the work. 172 The common mission and vision seemed
to nourish relationship-building. “Now you know somebody who works for this
specific organization. And you’ve developed that rapport with them. So, if you
see the potential for collaboration in the future, I have a trusted partner that I can
work with and bring into a project and have more collaboration. It was a great
way to just connect with people and reinforce that we’re here for community,”
said a campaign organizer. 173 Statements such as this highlight the personal and
professional development of participants in the campaign, but also the
propensity for capacity-building demonstrated by PrepareSTL.
Lastly, the campaign intentionally wove other advocacy efforts into its
outreach platform. For example, at neighborhood events, the campaign had voter
registration as well as resources about the 2020 Census and Medicaid expansion.
One campaign organizer explained, “For everything, we had voter registration
and more information about the census or different things like that . . . . It’s
things that are important to community, that have direct impact on
community.” 174 There is significant opportunity for PrepareSTL to expand
advocacy efforts through its established community infrastructure.
D. Campaign Challenges
In many ways, the PrepareSTL campaign has had to contend with the same
forces that have historically entrenched inequity in the Black community and
other communities of color. For example, one respondent stated, “We saw
testing sites open in more affluent places versus some of our low-income
170.
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places,” as she described accessibility of diagnostic testing as a major prevention
and mitigation effort in underserved neighborhoods. 175 The first testing site
opening in Chesterfield, Missouri on March 14, 2020, 176 where the population
is eighty percent White and only 6.6% combined Black and non-White Hispanic;
the median home value is $379,800. 177 The first testing site within St. Louis City
limits did not open until almost a month later, on April 2, 2020. 178 The lack of
testing available in Black and Brown communities foreshadowed the pandemicrelated challenges these communities would face.
The disproportionate access to early testing further sowed doubt within the
campaign’s target communities about the regional and local government’s
commitment to the well-being of communities of color and low-income
residents in St. Louis. Campaign organizers described hesitancy from
community members, stating, “sometimes people are wary of government-run
initiatives or government things because of [the] complicated history.” 179 This
reflection highlights both the importance of community-led and communitydeveloped initiative and elucidates the challenge of gaining public trust with
governmental organizations at the helm of such initiatives.
Community hesitancy was further bolstered by the inconsistency in
messaging from federal and regional organizations about COVID-19. 180 Public
health groups and health care workers around the world reeled from the rapidly
evolving advice as scientists researched this emerging infectious disease.
However, in the United States, messaging was perhaps particularly inconsistent
as the response to the pandemic was politicized. Several respondents expressed
frustration towards “combatting some very serious inaction and some poorly
executed politics” at the regional level. 181 This challenge was reflected in delays
accessing PPE and delays setting up testing sites in low-income neighborhoods
of the St. Louis Metro region. 182
175. Interview, supra note 120.
176. SLM Staff, Mercy Will Open a Drive Through Coronavirus (COVID-19) Testing Site in
Chesterfield, ST. LOUIS MAG. (Mar. 13, 2020, 11:53 AM), https://www.stlmag.com/health/news
/mercy-will-open-coronavirus-testing-site-chesterfield/.
177. QuickFacts: Chesterfield City, Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov
/quickfacts/fact/table/chesterfieldcitymissouri/PST120219 (last visited Apr. 18, 2021).
178. St. Louis Opens First Mobile COVID-19 Testing Site in North City, ST. LOUIS AM. (Mar.
31, 2020), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/local_news/st-louis-opens-first-mobile-covid-19testing-site-in-north-city/article_a536ecd0-735c-11ea-aced-2b64fc3ccda7.html.
179. Interview, supra note 150.
180. See David Blake & Kristina Arianina, Potential Federal vs. State Conflicts Due to COVID19, LAW360 (Apr. 9, 2020, 2:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1262048/potential-federalvs-state-conflicts-due-to-covid-19.
181. Interview, supra note 112.
182. Compare SLM Staff, supra note 113 (noting the early opening of a COVID-19 testing site
in Chesterfield), with ST. LOUIS AM., supra note 115 (noting the May opening of a COVID-19
testing site in North City).
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An additional barrier to achieving the campaign’s objectives was the
reported inaccuracy of civil information, as canvassing businesses was a
principal outreach strategy for the campaign. One canvasser reported, “I had
addresses that didn’t exist or just things weren’t there that they thought [were]
there.” 183 Responses from canvassing identified the need for an updated and
verified business database for this campaign and others with similar approaches
to community outreach.
Additionally, some executive leaders reported that one challenge presented
to organizers of a coalition-based campaign such as PrepareSTL was the
decentralization of decisions and decision-makers. One leader stated,
“sometimes it was difficult to ascertain . . . where [a] decision should be
made.” 184 While the coordination of multiple organizations and public health
entities was identified as a strength of the campaign, some respondents stated
that not centralizing leadership could be a hindrance to coordinating a rapid
response in times of crisis, if not handled correctly. The team continues to
evaluate effective ways to practice shared decision-making amongst community
members and organizers while enhancing the ability to respond quickly to an
evolving situation.
Executive leaders also cited legal and institutional policies as challenges to
the goals of PrepareSTL. For instance, some organizational policies barred the
use of donated funds toward gift cards to compensate campaign workers. In
another case, human resource professionals warned against encouraging inperson community engagement due to liability of injury or illness to volunteers.
These executive leaders highlight a clear need for organizations to be intentional
about setting policies and outlining protocols that support the organizations’
ultimate mission.
The greatest concern among campaign organizers was, and continues to be,
limiting the spread of COVID-19 and mitigating the harm caused by this disease.
The team faced skepticism from community members and health officials about
the campaign’s ability to send volunteers into the community without causing
further spread of the disease, either to the communities or among volunteers.
One executive leader cited not wanting “to send people out without the
appropriate protections” as a primary consideration for organizers. 185 A major
component of organizing this campaign was developing rigorous safety
protocols and securing sufficient PPE for volunteers to safely perform all
campaign activities. This campaign would not have been possible to execute
safely without the safety equipment provided by organizational partners and
tailored safety consulting from partners and a physician consultant.

183. Interview, supra note 113.
184. Interview, supra note 112.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article outlines lessons learned from the unique approach of the
PrepareSTL campaign—a regional campaign spearheaded by community
voice—that formed out of urgency and prioritization of at-risk populations amid
the COVID-19 pandemic. In March 2020, when the novel coronavirus was still
new and largely not understood, the campaign committed to focusing outreach
towards communities of color, primarily low-to-moderate income Black and
foreign-born community members. The distinct emphasis placed on such
populations by PrepareSTL has also magnified health barriers and social
constraints exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. PrepareSTL leaders
combatted these challenges in an asset-based approach, building relationships
across sectors and experience, and relying on a team of majority Black women.
The PrepareSTL campaign did its due diligence of tailoring and expanding
known public health campaign best practices, specifically those intended to
engage communities of color, like the audience of PrepareSTL. The campaign
also implemented unique strategies that propelled its reach, flexibility, and
impact. Ultimately, a strong network of relationships—bolstered by a genuine
sense of community care—served as the necessary groundwork for securing
external and internal commitment, trust, and collaboration. The collaborative
team of sponsoring organizations and consultants was well-resourced in the
community, with ties to funders, community partners, and St. Louis residents.
Strong relationships also grew out of the collaborative efforts.
PrepareSTL became a trusted messenger in the region. Residents, public
health leaders, and organizational leaders were willing to listen. Multiple
approaches were necessary to reach the widest possible audience within the
campaign’s target demographic. The combination of mass media strategies with
personalized outreach ensured the campaign had a broad educational reach with
a higher likelihood of behavioral change. Furthermore, engaging community
champions as campaign messengers was critical in outreach efforts. Through
communications and outreach, PrepareSTL identified community needs and
responded to them.
The organizing team, responsible for the outputs of the campaign, developed
an organic and well-designed structure that kept all layers of the campaign
engaged. The team’s processes incorporated input from all stakeholders,
including community champions, on an ongoing basis. Furthermore, the
organizing team compensated its canvassers. Together, these strategies helped
promote successful outreach strategies with broad reach at the neighborhoodlevel. One member of the campaign team spoke to the collaborative structure of
the organizing team:
Coming from a little bit of an outsider’s perspective, you know, not being a
person of color, not being a person who is involved in some of these circles
directly . . . it was very unique and very awesome to witness seeing everyone
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coming from different areas within and having different voices and perspectives,
but still very much committed to moving it forward. And I think that’s part of
why [we were] able to do a lot, rather than just say we’re going to do a lot, which
I think, again, has made us unique, at least within like the Missouri space. 186

The PrepareSTL campaign aims to elevate and emphasize communities
often overlooked, like those of Black and Brown, unhoused, or foreign-born
populations. Within the PrepareSTL campaign, community members were able
to connect and find ownership in a regional public health initiative that directly
impacted their daily lives. PrepareSTL demonstrates that leaders can be found
in all neighborhoods. “There is value in having Black and Brown people in
certain positions,” said a respondent. 187 Another organizer emphatically stated,
“trust Black women.” 188 Other community organizers, public health campaigns,
and general collaboratives can glean points of reference from the PrepareSTL
model. The PrepareSTL campaign team hopes to encourage public health
leadership and practitioners to embrace a new way of working with community
stakeholders, building and sharing power across levels.
The PrepareSTL campaign remains active at the time of this writing. Over
the past several months, the campaign has been engaging and listening to
partners to better understand community needs. Amid the announcement of the
COVID-19 vaccine, people want access to factual information from a neutral
source: a source that will not tell them what to do, but instead support their
personal decision to make the right choice for them and their families. Centering
people of color and foreign-born communities while respecting individual
agency, PrepareSTL has positioned itself as a trusted source for information
sharing and learning. Thus, in addition to the continuation of PPE distribution,
the PrepareSTL campaign prepares to lean into an education series centered
around Living Well in the Era of Covid, covering topics such as informed choice
about the COVID-19 vaccines, overall well-being, holistic health and wellness,
and healing.
PrepareSTL has challenged the comfort of traditional collaboration and
established authentic, bidirectional community problem solving. “You can’t be
afraid to lose when you’re talking about changing a culture that existed for
decades at this point,” said a campaign respondent. 189 The unique, collaborative
origin of this campaign, born out of mission and not a mandate, exemplifies the
commitment, urgency, and fluidity of the campaign’s leadership. Furthermore,
the campaign’s community-centered design and management structure
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Interview, supra note 164.
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underscores its ability to address the pandemic while building community
infrastructure to “[help] St. Louisans of color prepare and prevail.” 190
In closing, we leave you with one final quote from a campaign respondent,
“If you want to see . . . similar successes, then you assemble a great group of
people; you give them a bunch of money; [you trust them] and you let them
go.” 191

190. About, supra note 3.
191. Interview, supra note 164.

